HEEDLESSNESS OF THE LEADERS of the Reich's foreign policy
when it came to establishing basic principles for an expedient
alliance policy was not only continued after the revolution
but was even exceeded. For if before the War general confusion
of political concepts could be regarded as the cause of
our faulty leadership in foreign policy, after the War it
was a lack of honorable intentions. It was natural that
the circles who saw their destructive aims finally achieved
by the revolution could possess no interest in an alliance
policy whose final result would inevitably be the re-establishment
of a free German state. Not only that such a development
would have run counter to the inner sense of the November
crime, not only that it would have interrupted or actually
ended the internationalization of the German economy: but
also the domestic political effects resulting from a victorious
fight for freedom in the field of foreign policy would in
the future have meant doom for the present holders of power
in the Reich. For the resurrection of a nation is not conceivable
without its preceding nationalization, as, conversely, every
great success in the sphere of foreign affairs inevitably
produces reactions in the same direction. Every fight for
freedom, as experience shows, leads to an intensification
of national sentiment, of self-reliance, and hence also
to a sharper sensibility toward anti-national elements and
tendencies. Conditions and persons who are tolerated in
peaceable times, who often, in fact, pass unnoticed, are
not only rebuffed in times of seething national enthusiasm,
but encounter a resistance that is not seldom fatal to them.
Just recall, for example, the general fear of spies which
at the outbreak of wars suddenly bursts forth in the fever
heat of human passions and leads to the most brutal, sometimes
even unjust persecutions, though everyone might tell himself
that the danger of spies will be greater in the long years
of a peaceful period, even though, for obvious reasons,
it does not receive general attention to the same extent.
this reason alone the subtle instinct of the government
parasites washed to the surface by the November events senses
that an uprising of our people for freedom, supported by
an intelligent alliance policy and the resultant outburst
of national passions, would mean the possible end of their
own criminal existence.
it becomes understandable why the government authorities
in power since 1918 have failed us in the field of foreign
affairs and why the leaders of the state have almost always
worked systematically against the real interests of the
German nation. For what at first sight might appear planless
is revealed on closer examination as merely the logical
continuation of the road which the November revolution for
the first time openly trod.
to be sure, we must distinguish between the responsible
or rather 'should-be-responsible' leaders of our state affairs,
the average parliamentary politicasters, and the great stupid
sheep's herd of patient lamblike people.
first know what they want. The others play along, either
because they know it or are too cowardly to ruthlessly oppose
what they have recognized and felt to be harmful. And the
others submit from incomprehension and stupidity.
long as the National Socialist German Workers' Party possessed
only the scope of a small and little known club, problems
of foreign policy could possess only a subordinate importance
in the eyes of many adherents. This especially because our
movement in particular has always upheld and must always
uphold the conception that external freedom comes neither
as a gift from heaven nor from earthly powers, but can only
be the fruit of development of inner strength. Only the
elimination of the causes of our collapse, as well as the
destruction of its beneficiaries can create the premise
for our outward fight for freedom.
so it is understandable if, due to such considerations,
in the first period of the young movement the value of questions
of foreign policy was set below the importance of its domestic
once the limits of the small, insignificant club were broadened
and finally broken, and the young formation obtained the
importance of a big organization, the necessity arose of
taking a position on the questions pertaining to the developments
in foreign affairs. It became necessary to lay down guiding
principles which would not only not contradict the fundamental
view of our world concept, but actually represent an emanation
of this line of thought.
from our people's lack of schooling in foreign affairs,
there results for the young movement an obligation to transmit
to the individual leaders as well as the great masses through
broad guiding principles a line of thought in matters of
foreign policy, which is the premise for any practical execution
in the future of the preparations in the field of foreign
policy for the work of recovering the freedom of our people
as well as a real sovereignty of the Reich.
essential fundamental and guiding principle, which we must
always bear in mind in judging this question, is that foreign
policy is only a means to an end, and that the end is solely
the promotion of our own nationality. No consideration of
foreign policy can proceed from any other criterion than
this: Does it benefit our nationality now or in the future,
or will it be injurious to it?
is the sole preconceived opinion permissible in dealing
with this question. Partisan, religious humanitarian, and
all other criteria in general, are completely irrelevant.
before the War the task of a German foreign policy was to
safeguard the sustenance of our people and its children
on this globe by the preparation of the roads that can lead
to this goal, as well as the winning of the necessary helpers
in the form of expedient allies, today it is the same, with
the single difference: Before the War, it was a question
of helping to preserve the German nationality, taking into
account the existing strength of the independent power state,
today it is necessary first to restore to the nation its
strength in the form of a free power state, which is the
premise for the subsequent implementation of a practical
foreign policy which will preserve, promote, and sustain
our people for the future.
other words: The aim of a German foreign policy of
today must be the preparation for the reconquest of freedom
here a fundamental principle must always be kept in mind:
The possibility of regaining independence for a nationality
is not absolutely bound up with the integrity of a state
territory, but rather with the existence of a remnant, even
though small, of this people and state, which, in possession
of the necessary freedom, not only can embody the spiritual
community of the whole nationality, but also can prepare
the military fight for freedom.
a nation of a hundred million people, in order to preserve
its state integrity, suffers the yoke of slavery in common;
it is worse than if such a state and such a people had been
shattered and only a part of them remained in possession
of full freedom. On condition, to be sure, that this last
remnant were filled with the holy mission of not only proclaiming
its spiritual and cultural inseparability, but also of accomplishing
the military preparation for the final liberation and reunion
of the unfortunate oppressed portions.
should further be borne in mind that the question of regaining
lost sections of a people's and state's territory is always
primarily a question of regaining the political power and
independence of the mother country; that, therefore, in
such a case the interests of lost territories must be ruthlessly
subordinated to the interest of regaining the freedom of
the main territory. For the liberation of oppressed, separated
splinters of a nationality or of provinces of a country
does not take place on the basis of a desire on the part
of the oppressed people or of a protest on the part of those
left behind, but through the implements of power of those
remnants of the former common fatherland that are still
more or less sovereign.
the presupposition for the gaining of lost territories is
the intensive promotion and strengthening of the remaining
remnant state and the unshakable decision slumbering in
the heart to dedicate the new force thus arising to the
freedom and unification of the entire nationality in the
proper hour: therefore, subordination of the interests of
the separated territories to the single interest of winning
for the remaining remnant that measure of political power
and strength which is the precondition for a correction
of the will of hostile victors. For oppressed territories
are led back to the bosom of a common Reich, not by flaming
protests, but by a mighty sword.
forge this sword is the task of a country's internal political
leadership; to safeguard the work of forging and seek comrades
in arms is the function of diplomatic leadership.
the first volume of this work I have discussed the halfheartedness
of our alliance policy before the War. Of the four roads
to a future preservation of our nationality and its sustenance,
the fourth and least favorable was chosen. In place of a
healthy European land policy, a colonial and commercial
policy was chosen. This was all the more fallacious as it
was thought that an armed settlement could in this way be
avoided. The result of this attempt to sit on several chairs
was the proverbial fall between them, and the World War
was only the last reckoning submitted the Reich for its
faulty conduct of foreign affairs.
correct road would even then have been the third: a strengthening
of our continental power by gaining new soil in Europe,
and precisely this seemed to place a completion by later
acquisitions of colonial territory within the realm of the
naturally possible. This policy, to be sure, could only
have been carried out in alliance with England or with so
abnormal an emphasis on the military implements of power
that for forty or fifty years cultural tasks would have
been forced into the background. This would have been quite
justifiable. The cultural importance of a nation is almost
always bound up with its political freedom and independence;
therefore, the latter is the presupposition for the existence,
or, better, the establishment, of the former. Therefore,
no sacrifice can be too great for the securing of political
freedom. What general cultural matters lose through an excessive
promotion of the state's implements of military power, it
will later be possible to restore most abundantly. Yes,
it may be said that, after such a concentrated exertion
in the sole direction of preserving state independence,
a certain relaxation or compensation customarily ensues
in the form of a really amazing golden age of the hitherto
neglected cultural forces of a nation. From the hardships
of the Persian Wars arose the Age of Pericles, and through
the cares of the Punic Wars the Roman state began to dedicate
itself to the service of a higher culture.
be sure, such a complete subordination of all a nation's
other interests to the sole task of preparing a coming contest
of arms for the future security of the state cannot be entrusted
to the decision of a majority of parliamentary idiots or
good-for-nothings. The father of a Frederick the Great was
able to prepare for a contest of arms, disregarding all
other concerns, but the fathers of our democratic parliamentary
nonsense of the Jewish variety cannot do so.
this very reason the military preparation for an acquisition
of land and soil in Europe could be only a limited one,
and the support of suitable allies could hardly be dispensed
however, our leaders wanted to know nothing of a systematic
preparation for war,. they renounced the acquisition of
land in Europe and, by turning instead to a colonial and
commercial policy, sacrificed the alliance with England
which would otherwise have been possible, but did not, as
would have been logical, seek the support of Russia, and
finally, forsaken by all except the Habsburg hereditary
evil, stumbled into the World War.
characterizing our present foreign policy, it must be said
that there exists no visible or even intelligible line.
Before the War the fourth road was erroneously taken, and
that pursued only by halves, while since the revolution
no road at all has been discernible, even to the sharpest
eye. Even more than before the War, any systematic thought
is lacking, except perhaps an attempt to smash the last
possibility of a resurrection of our people.
cool appraisal of the present European relations of power
leads to the following conclusion:
three hundred years the history of our continent has been
basically determined by the attempt of England to obtain
the necessary protection in the rear for great British aims
in world politics, indirectly through balanced, mutually
interlocking relations of power.
traditional tendency of British diplomacy, which in Germany
can only be compared with the tradition of the Prussian
army, was, since the efforts of Queen Elizabeth, directed
solely toward preventing by all possible means the rise
of any European great power above its place in the general
hierarchy, and, if possible, to break it by military intervention.
The instruments of power which England was accustomed to
apply in this case varied according to the existing or presented
task; but the determination and will power for using them
were always the same. Indeed, the more difficult England's
situation became in the course of time, the more necessary
it seemed to the leaders of the British Empire to keep the
individual state powers of Europe in a state of general
paralysis resulting from mutual rivalries. The political
separation of the former North American colonial territory
led, in the ensuing period, to the greatest exertions to
keep the European rear absolutely covered. And so - after
the destruction of Spain and the Netherlands as great sea
powers - the strength of the English was concentrated against
aspiring France until finally, with the fall of Napoleon,
the danger to England of this most dangerous military power's
hegemony could be regarded as broken.
shift of British policy against Germany was undertaken only
slowly, not only because, due to the lack of a national
unification of the German nation, a visible danger for England
did not exist, but also because public opinion, prepared
by propaganda for a particular political goal, is slow in
following new aims. The sober knowledge of the statesman
seems transposed into emotional values which are not only
more fruitful in their momentary efficacy, but also more
stable with regard to duration. Therefore the statesman,
after achieving one purpose, can without further ado turn
his thought processes toward new goals, but it will be possible
to transform the masses emotionally into an instrument of
their leader's new view only by slow propagandist efforts.
early as 1870-71, England had meanwhile formulated her new
position. Fluctuations which occurred at times, due to the
importance of America in world economy as well as Russia's
development as a political power, were unfortunately not
utilized by Germany, so that a steady intensification of
the original tendency in British statesmanship was bound
saw in Germany the power whose importance in commercial
and hence in world politics, not least as a result of her
enormous industrialization, was increasing to such a menacing
extent that the strength of the two states in identical
fields could already be balanced. The 'peaceful, economic'
conquest of the world which to the helmsmen of our state
seemed the highest emanation of the ultimate wisdom, became
for the English politicians the ground for the organization
of resistance against us. That this resistance assumed the
form of a comprehensively organized attack was fully in
keeping with the essence of a diplomacy whose aims did not
lie in the preservation of a questionable world
peace, but in the reinforcement of British world
domination. That England used as allies all states which
were in any way possible in the military sense was equally
in keeping with her traditional caution in the estimation
of the adversary's strength as with the appreciation of
her own momentary weakness. This can, therefore, not be
characterized as 'unscrupulousness,' because such a comprehensive
organization of a war is to be judged by criteria, not of
heroism, but of expediency. Diplomacy must see to it
that a people does not heroically perish, but is practically
preserved. Every road that leads to this is then expedient,
and not taking it must be characterized as criminal neglect
the revolutionization of Germany, the British concern over
a threatening Germanic world hegemony found an end, to the
relief of British statesmen.
then England has had no further interest in the complete
effacement of Germany from the map of Europe. On the contrary,
the terrible collapse which occurred in the November days
of 1918 placed British diplomacy in a new situation which
at first was not even considered possible.
four and a half years the British world empire had fought
in order to break the supposed preponderance of a continental
power. Now suddenly a crash occurred which seemed to remove
this power entirely from the picture. There was manifested
such an absence of even the most primitive instinct of self-preservation
that the European balance seemed thrown off its hinges by
an action of scarcely forty-eight hours: Germany destroyed
and France the first continental power of Europe.
enormous propaganda which had made the British people persevere
and hold out in this war, which recklessly incited them
and stirred up all their deepest instincts and passions,
now inevitably weighed like lead on the decisions of British
statesmen. With the colonial, economic, and commercial destruction
of Germany, the British war aim was achieved; anything beyond
this was a curtailment of English interests. Through wiping
out a German power state in continental Europe, only the
enemies of England could gain. Nevertheless, in the November
days of 1918 and up to midsummer of 1919, a reorientation
of English diplomacy, which in this long war more than ever
before had used up the emotional powers of the great masses,
was no longer possible. It was not possible from the viewpoint
of the existing attitude of their own people, and was not
possible in view of the disposition of the military relation
of forces. France had seized upon the law of action and
could dictate to the others. The single power, however,
which in these months of haggling and bargaining might have
brought about a change, Germany herself, lay in the convulsions
of inner civil war and only kept on proclaiming, through
the mouth of her so-called statesmen, her readiness to accept
any dictate whatsoever.
if in the life of peoples, a nation, in consequence of its
total lack of an instinct of self-preservation, ceases to
be a possible 'active' ally, she customarily sinks to the
level of a slave nation and her land succumbs to the fate
of a colony.
to prevent France's power from becoming excessive, a participation
of England in her predatory lusts was the sole possible
form for England herself.
England did not achieve her war aim. The rise of a European
power above the relations of forces of the continental state
system of Europe was not only not prevented but was given
1914, Germany as a military state was wedged in between
two countries one of which disposed of an equal power and
the other of a superior power. On top of this came the superior
sea power of England; France and Russia alone offered obstacles
and resistance to every disproportionate development of
German greatness. The extremely unfavorable situation of
the Reich from the viewpoint of military geography could
be considered a further coefficient of security against
an excessive increase in the power of this country. The
coastline especially was unfavorable from the military standpoint
for a fight with England; it was short and cramped, and
the land front, on the other hand, disproportionately long
situation of France today is different: the first military
power, without a serious rival on the continent; on her
southern borders, as good as guaranteed against Spain and
Italy; secured against Germany by the feebleness of the
fatherland; her coastline on a long front poised directly
opposite the vital nerves of the British Empire. Not only
for airplanes and long-distance batteries do the English
vital centers constitute worth-while targets, but also her
trade lanes are exposed to the effects of submarine warfare.
A submarine campaign, based on the long Atlantic coast and
the equally long stretches of the French border territories
of the Mediterranean in Europe and North Africa, would be
devastating in effect.
the fruit of the struggle against the development of Germany's
power was politically to bring about French hegemony on
the continent. The military result: the reinforcement of
France as the first prime power on land and the recognition
of the Union as an equal sea power. Economically: the surrender
of immense spheres of British interest to former allies.
as England's traditional political aims desire and necessitate
a certain Balkanization of Europe, those of France necessitate
a Balkanization of Germany.
desire is and remains the prevention of the rise of a continental
power to world-political importance; that is, the maintenance
of a certain balance of power between the European states;
for this seems the presupposition of a British world hegemony.
desire is and remains to prevent the formation of a unified
power in Germany, the maintenance of a system of German
petty states with balanced power relations and without unified
leadership, and occupation of the left bank of the Rhine
as the presupposition for creating and safeguarding her
position of hegemony in Europe.
ultimate aim of French diplomacy will always stand in conflict
with the ultimate tendency of British statesmanship.
who undertakes an examination of the present alliance
possibilities for Germany from the above standpoint
must arrive at the conclusion that the last practicable
tie remains with England. Terrible as the consequences of
the English war policy were and are for Germany, we must
not close our eyes to the fact that a necessary interest
on the part of England in the annihilation of Germany no
longer exists today; that, on the contrary, England's
policy from year to year must be directed more and more
to an obstruction of France's unlimited drive for hegemony.
An alliance policy is not conducted from the standpoint
of retrospective grudges, but is fructified by the knowledge
of retrospective experience. And experience should have
taught us that alliances for the achievement of negative
aims languish from inner weakness. National destinies
are firmly forged together only by the prospect of a common
success in the sense of common gains, conquests; in short,
of a mutual extension of power.
feebly our people think in terms of foreign policy can be
seen most clearly from the current press reports with regard
to the greater or lesser 'friendliness to Germany'
of this or that foreign statesman; such reports see a special
guaranty of a benevolent policy toward our nationality in
this supposed attitude on the part of such personalities.
This is an utterly incredible absurdity, a speculation on
the unparalleled simplicity of the average German shopkeeper
dabbling in politics. No English or American or Italian
statesman was ever 'pro-German.' As a statesman,
every Englishman will naturally be even more of an Englishman,
every American an American, and no Italian will be
found ready to pursue any other policy than a pro-Italian
one. Therefore, anyone who thinks he can base alliances
with foreign nations on a pro-German orientation
of their leading statesmen is either an ass or a hypocrite.
The premise for the linking of national destinies is never
based on mutual respect, let alone affection,
but on the prospect of expediency for both contracting
parties. In other words: true as it is that an English statesman
will always pursue a pro-English policy and never a pro-German
one, certain definite interests of this pro-English
policy may for the most varying reasons coincide with pro-German
interests. This, of course, need only be the case up to
a certain degree and can some day shift to the exact opposite;
but the skill of a leading statesman is manifested precisely
in always finding at specified periods those partners for
the achievement of their own needs, who must go the same
road in pursuit of their own interests.
practical moral of all this for the present can result only
from the answer to the following questions: What states
at the present time have no vital interest in having the
French economic and military power achieve a position of
dominant hegemony in Europe by the total exclusion of a
German Central Europe? Yes, which states on the basis of
their own requirements for existence and their previous
political tradition see a threat to their own future in
such a development?
on this point we must at length achieve full clarity: The
inexorable mortal enemy of the German people is and remains
France It matters not at all who ruled or will rule in France,
whether Bourbons or Jacobins, Bonapartists or bourgeois
democrats, Clerical republicans or Red Bolshevists: the
final goal of their activity in foreign affairs will always
be an attempt to seize possession of the Rhine border and
to secure this watercourse for France by means of a dismembered
and shattered Germany.
desires no Germany as a world power, but wishes no power
at all called Germany: quite an essential difference, after
all Today we are not fighting for a position as a world
power; today we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland,
for the unity of our nation and the daily bread of our children.
If we look about us for European allies from this standpoint,
there remain only two states: England and Italy.
does not want a France whose military fist, unobstructed
by the rest of Europe, can undertake a policy which, one
way or another, must one day cross English interests. England
can never desire a France which, in possession of the immense
Western European iron and coal deposits, obtains the foundations
of a menacing economic world position. And England, furthermore,
cannot desire a France whose continental political situation,
thanks to the shattering of the rest of Europe, seems so
assured that the resumption of a French world policy along
broader lines is not only made possible but positively forced.
The Zeppelin bombs of former times might multiply a thousandfold
every night; the military preponderance of France presses
heavy on the heart of Great Britain's world empire.
Italy, too, cannot and will not desire a further reinforcement
of the French position of superior power in Europe. Italy's
future will always be conditioned by a development which
is geographically grouped around the Mediterranean basin.
What drove Italy into the war was really not the desire
to aggrandize France, but the desire to give the hated Adriatic
rival the death blow. Any further continental strengthening
of France, however, is an obstacle to Italy in the future,
and we must not delude ourselves that relations of parentage
among nations can in any way exclude rivalries.
soberest and coldest reflection, it is today primarily these
two states, England and Italy, whose most
natural selfish interests are not, in the most essential
points at least, opposed to the German nation's requirements
for existence, and are, indeed, to a certain extent, identified
must, to be sure, in judging such a possibility of alliance,
not overlook three factors. The first depends on us, the
two others on the states in question.
any nation ally itself with the present-day Germany?
Can a power which seeks in an alliance an aid for carrying
out offensive aims of its own, ally itself with a
state whose leaders for years have offered a picture of
the most wretched incompetence, of pacifistic cowardice,
and the greater part of whose population, in democratic-Marxist
blindness, betray the interests of their own nation and
country in a way that cries to high Heaven? Can any power
hope today to create a valuable relation with a state, in
the hope of some day fighting in common for common interests,
when this country obviously possesses neither the courage
nor the desire to stir so much as a finger in defense of
its own bare existence? Will any power, for which an alliance
is and should be more than a treaty for the guaranty and
maintenance of a state of slow putrefaction like the old
Triple Alliance, obligate itself for weal or woe to a state
whose characteristic way of life consists only in cringing
submissiveness without and disgraceful oppression of national
virtues within; with a state that no longer possesses any
greatness, since on the basis of its whole behavior it no
longer deserves it; with governments which can boast of
no respect whatsoever on the part of their citizens, so
that foreign countries cannot possibly harbor any greater
admiration for them?
a power which itself wants to be respected and which hopes
to gain more from alliances than fees for hungry parliamentarians
will not ally itself with present-day Germany; indeed, it
cannot. And in our present unfitness for alliance lies
the deepest and ultimate ground for the solidarity of the
enemy bandits. Since Germany never defends herself,
except by a few flaming protests on the part of our parliamentary
élite, and the rest of the world has no reason for fighting
in our defense, and as a matter of principle God does not
make cowardly nations free - notwithstanding the whimpering
of our patriotic leagues to that effect - there remains
nothing else even for the states which possess no direct
interest in our total annihilation but to take part in France's
campaigns of pillage, if only, by such cooperation and participation
in the pillage, at least to prevent the exclusive strengthening
of France alone.
we must not overlook the difficulty in undertaking a reorientation
of the great popular masses of the countries previously
hostile to us, who have been influenced in a certain direction
by mass propaganda. For it is not possible to represent
a nationality as 'Huns,' 'robbers,' 'Vandals,' etc., over
a period of years, only to discover the opposite suddenly
overnight, and recommend the former enemy as the ally
even more attention must be given to a third fact which
will be of essential importance for the shaping of the coming
European alliance relations:
interest as England, from a British state viewpoint, may
have in a further annihilation of Germany, that of the international
stock exchange Jews in such a development is great. The
cleavage between the official, or, better expressed, the
traditional, British statesmanship and the controlling Jewish
stock exchange powers is nowhere better shown than in their
different position on the questions of British foreign policy.
Jewish finance in opposition to the interests of the
British state welfare desires not only the complete economic
annihilation of Germany, but also her complete political
enslavement. The inter nationalization of our German
economy - that is, the appropriation of the German labor
power by Jewish world finance - can be completely carried
out only in a politically Bolshevist state. But if the Marxist
shock troops of international Jewish stock exchange capital
are to break the back of the German national state for good
and all this can only be done with friendly aid from outside
The armies of France must, therefore, besiege the German
state structure until the Reich, inwardly exhausted, succumbs
to the Bolshevistic shock troop of international Jewish
so the Jew today is the great agitator for the complete
destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we read of
attacks against Germany, Jews are their fabricators, just
as in peacetime and during the War the press of the Jewish
stock exchange and Marxists systematically stirred up hatred
against Germany until state after state abandoned neutrality
and, renouncing the true interests of the peoples, entered
the service of the World War coalition.
Jewish train of thought in all this is clear. The Bolshevization
of Germany - that is, the extermination of the national
folkish Jewish intelligentsia to make possible the sweating
of the German working class under the yoke of Jewish world
finance - is conceived only as a preliminary to the further
extension of this Jewish tendency of world conquest. As
often in history, Germany is the great pivot in the mighty
struggle. If our people and our state become the victim
of these bloodthirsty and avaricious Jewish tyrants of nations,
the whole earth will sink into the snares of this octopus;
if Germany frees herself from this embrace, this greatest
of dangers to nations may be regarded as broken for the
as surely as the Jews will bring their entire agitational
efforts to bear, not only to maintain the hostility of the
nations to Germany, but if possible to increase it even
more, just as surely only a fraction of this activity coincides
with the real interests of the peoples poisoned by it. In
general, the Jews will always fight within the various national
bodies with those weapons which on the basis of the recognized
mentality of these nations seem most effective and promise
the greatest success. In our national body, so torn
with regard to blood, it is therefore the more or less 'cosmopolitan,'
pacifistic-ideological ideas, arising from this fact; in
short, the international tendencies which they utilize in
their struggle for power: in France they work with the well-known
and correctly estimated chauvinism; in England with economic
and world-political considerations; in short, they always
utilize the most essential qualities that characterize the
mentality of a people. Only when in such a way they have
achieved a certain profusion of economic and political influence
and predominance do they strip off the fetters of these
borrowed weapons, and display in exactly the same measure
the true inner purposes of their will and their struggle.
They now begin to destroy with ever-greater rapidity, until
they have turned one state after another into a heap of
rubble on which they can then establish the sovereignty
of the eternal Jewish empire.
England as well as Italy the cleavage between the views
of the better indigenous statesmanship and the will of the
world stock exchange Jews is clear; sometimes, indeed, it
is crassly obvious.
in France does there exist today more than ever an inner
unanimity between the intentions of the Jew-controlled
stock exchange and the desire of the chauvinist-minded
national statesmen. But in this very identity there
lies an immense danger for Germany. For this very reason,
France is and remains by far the most terrible enemy. This
people, which is basically becoming more and more negrified,
constitutes in its tie with the aims of Jewish world domination
an enduring danger for the existence of the white race in
Europe. For the contamination by Negro blood on the
Rhine in the heart of Europe is just as much in keeping
with the perverted sadistic thirst for vengeance of this
hereditary enemy of our people as is the ice-cold calculation
of the Jew thus to begin bastardizing the European continent
at its core and to deprive the white race of the foundations
for a sovereign existence through infection with lower humanity.
France, spurred on by her own thirst for vengeance and systematically
led by the Jew, is doing in Europe today is a sin against
the existence of white humanity and some day will incite
against this people all the avenging spirits of a race which
has recognized racial pollution as the original sin of humanity.
Germany, however, the French menace constitutes an obligation
to subordinate all considerations of sentiment and hold
out a hand to those who, threatened as much as we are, will
neither suffer nor tolerate France's desires for domination.
the predictable future there can be only two allies for
Germany in Europe: England and Italy.
who takes the trouble to glance back and follow Germany's
leadership in foreign policy since the revolution will,
in view of the constant and incomprehensible failure of
our governments, be unable to do otherwise than take his
head in his hands, and either simply despair or, in flaming
indignation, declare war on such a régime. These actions
no longer have anything in common with lack of understanding:
for what would have seemed unthinkable to any thinking brain
has been done by these intellectual Cyclopses of our November
parties: they have courted France's favor. Yes, indeed,
in all these years, with the touching simplicity of incorrigible
dreamers, they have tried again and again to make friends
with France; over and over again they have bowed and scraped
before the 'great nation'; in every shrewd trick of the
French hangman they have felt justified in seeing the first
sign of a visible change of attitude. Our real political
wirepullers, of course, never harbored this insane belief.
For them currying favor with France was only the obvious
means of sabotaging every practical alliance policy.
They were never in doubt as to the aims of France and her
men behind the scenes. What compelled them to act as if
they nevertheless honestly believed in the possibility of
a change in the fate of Germany was the sober realization
that otherwise our people would take things into their own
for us, of course, it is hard to represent England as a
possible future ally in the ranks of our own movement. Again
and again our Jewish press has known how to concentrate
special hatred on England, and many a good German simpleton
has fallen into the Jewish snare with the greatest willingness,
drooled about 'strengthening' German sea power, protested
against the rape of our colonies, recommended their reconquest,
and thus helped furnish the material which the Jewish scoundrel
could pass on to his fellow Jews in England for practical
propagandist use. For it should gradually dawn even on our
political bourgeois simpletons that what we have to fight
for today is not 'sea power,' etc. The orientation of the
German national strength toward this aim, without the most
thoroughgoing previous securing of our position in Europe,
was an absurdity even before the War. Today such a hope
must be counted among those stupidities which in the field
of politics are characterized as crimes.
it was really maddening to be compelled to look on as the
Jewish wirepullers succeeded in occupying our people with
things that are today of the most secondary nature, inciting
them to demonstrations and protests, while at the same time
France was tearing piece after piece out of the flesh of
our national body, and the foundations of our independence
were systematically taken away from us.
I must recall a special hobby which in these years the Jew
rode with amazing adroitness: the South Tyrol.
the South Tyrol. If I here concern myself with this
particular question, it is not least to settle accounts
with that hypocritical rabble which, counting on the forgetfulness
and stupidity of our broad strata, has the insolence to
mimic on this point a national indignation, which is more
alien especially to the parliamentary swindlers than honest
conceptions of property to a magpie.
would like to emphasize that I personally am among the men
who, when the fate of the South Tyrol was being decided
- that is, beginning in August, 1914, up to November, 1918
- went where this territory was being actively defended
- I mean the army. In those years I did my part of the fighting,
not in order that the South Tyrol should be lost, but in
order that it should be preserved for the fatherland just
like every other German province.
ones who did not do their bit at that time were the parliamentary
sneak-thieves, all the politics-playing party rabble. On
the contrary, while we fought in the conviction that only
a victorious issue to the War would preserve this South
Tyrol for the German nationality, the big-mouths of these
Ephialteses agitated and plotted against victory until at
last the battling Siegfried succumbed to the treacherous
dagger thrust. For the preservation of the South Tyrol
in German possession was naturally not guaranteed by the
lying inflammatory speeches of parliamentary sharpers on
the Vienna Rathausplatz or in front of the Munich Feldherrnhalle,
but only by the battalions at the fighting front. Those
who broke this front betrayed the South Tyrol, just as they
betrayed all other German territories.
anyone who believes today that he can solve the South Tyrol
question by protests, declarations, clubby parades,
is either a very special scoundrel or a German petit bourgeois.
must clearly recognize the fact that the recovery of the
lost territories is not won through solemn appeals to the
Lord or through pious hopes in a league of Nations, but
only by force of arms.
so the only question is, Who is ready to attempt the reconquest
of these lost territories by defiant armed force?
far as my person is concerned, I can here assure you with
a clear conscience that I could still muster up enough courage
to take part in the victorious conquest of the South Tyrol
at the head of a parliamentary storm battalion that ought
to be formed, consisting of parliamentary big-mouths and
other party leaders plus various privy councilors. God knows
it would give me pleasure if suddenly a few shrapnel would
burst over the heads of such a 'flaming' protest demonstration.
I think if a fox were to break into a chicken-coop the cackling
could hardly be worse, or the rush of the feathered fowl
for safety any quicker, than the flight of such a splendid
the vile thing about the whole business is that the gentlemen
themselves do not believe they can achieve anything in this
way. They personally know, better than anyone else, the
impossibility and innocuousness of all the fuss they are
making. But they carry on as they do, because it is naturally
somewhat easier to shoot off their mouths for the recovery
of the South Tyrol today than it once was to fight for keeping
it. Everyone does his own part; then we sacrificed our blood,
and today this company sharpen their beaks.
is especially delightful, moreover, to see how Viennese
legitimist circles literally bristle with their present
activity for regaining the South Tyrol. Seven years ago,
to be sure, their noble and exalted ruling house helped
by a scoundrelly deed of treacherous perjury to make it
possible for the victorious world coalition to win among
other things the South Tyrol. At that time these circles
supported the policy of their treacherous dynasty, and didn't
care a damn about the South Tyrol or anything else. Today,
of course, it is easier to take up the struggle for these
territories, for today, after all, it is fought only with
'spiritual weapons,' and it is always easier to talk your
throat hoarse in some 'protest meeting' - from noble, heartfelt
indignation - and wear your fingers to the bone writing a
newspaper article than, say, to blow up bridges during the
occupation of the Ruhr.
reason why in the last few years certain definite circles
have made the 'South Tyrol' question the pivotal point of
German-Italian relations is obvious. Jews and Habsburg
legitimists have the greatest interest in preventing a German
alliance policy which might lead some day to the resurrection
of a free German fatherland. All this fuss today is not
made for love of the South Tyrol - which it does not help
but only harms - but for fear of a possible German-Italian
is quite in keeping with the general hypocrisy and slanderous
tendencies of these circles when they attempt with cold
and brazen gall to make things look as if we had
'betrayed' the South Tyrol.
these gentlemen let it be said with all plainness: the South
Tyrol was 'betrayed ' first and foremost by every German
with sound limbs who in the years 1914-1918 did not stand
somewhere at the front, putting his services at the disposal
of the fatherland;
by every man who in those years did not help to strengthen
our national body's power of resistance for the pursuit
of the War and to fortify the endurance of our people for
carrying through this fight to the end;
the South Tyrol was betrayed by every man who cooperated
in the outbreak of the November revolution - whether directly
by deed or indirectly by the cowardly toleration of the
deed - and thereby smashed the weapon which alone could
have saved the South Tyrol.
my brave lip-service protesters, that is how things
I am guided only by the sober realization that lost territories
are not won back by sharp parliamentary big-mouths and their
glibness of tongue, but by a sharp sword; in other words,
by a bloody fight.
I do not hesitate to declare that, now the dice have fallen,
I not only regard a reconquest of the South Tyrol by war
as impossible, but that I personally would reject it in
the conviction that for this question the flame of national
enthusiasm of the whole German people could not be achieved
to a degree which would offer the premise for victory. I
believe, on the contrary, that, if this blood some day were
staked, it would be a crime to stake it for two hundred
thousand Germans while next door more than seven millions
languish under foreign domination and the vital artery of
the German people runs through the hunting ground of African
the German nation wants to end a state of affairs that threatens
its extermination in Europe, it must not fall into the error
of the pre-War period and make enemies of God and the world;
it must recognize the most dangerous enemy and strike at
him with all its concentrated power. And if this victory
is obtained through sacrifices elsewhere, the coming generations
of our people will not condemn us. The more brilliant the
resultant successes, the better they will appreciate the
dire distress and profound cares, and the bitter decision
born of them.
must guide us today is again and again the basic insight
that the reconquest of a Reich's lost territories is primarily
the question of regaining the political independence and
power of the motherland.
make this possible and sure by an astute alliance policy
is the first task of a powerful German leadership in the
field of foreign affairs.
we National Socialists must guard against being taken in
tow by the Jewish-led bourgeois patriots of the word. Heaven
help us if our movement, instead of preparing for the struggle,
were to spend its time in protests!
fantastic conception of the Nibelungen alliance with the
Habsburg state cadaver has been the ruin of Germany. Fantastic
sentimentality in the treatment of today's diplomatic possibilities
is the best means of preventing our resurrection forever.
I must briefly take up those objections which apply to the
three questions raised above, to wit, the questions whether
make an alliance with the present-day Germany in her visible
weakness that is clear for all to see;
whether the enemy nations seem capable of such a reorientation
whether the existing influence of the Jews is not stronger
than any understanding or good intentions and will thus
frustrate and nullify all plans.
think I have sufficiently discussed one half of the first
question. Of course, no one will make an alliance with present-day
Germany. No power in the world will venture to link its
destiny to a state whose government is bound to destroy
all confidence. And as regards the attempt of many of our
national comrades to condone the government's actions because
of the wretched mentality of our people at the time, and
even accept this as an excuse, we must take the sharpest
position against this.
is true, the absence of character in our people for the
last six years has been profoundly sad, their indifference
toward the most important concerns of our nation has been
truly crushing, their cowardice has sometimes cried out
to high Heaven. But it must not be forgotten that we are
nevertheless dealing with a people which a few years previous
offered the world the most admirable example of the highest
human virtues. From the August days of 1914 up to the end
of the mighty conflict of nations, no people on earth revealed
more manly courage, tenacious endurance, and patience in
suffering than our German people which has today grown so
wretched. No one will maintain that the disgrace of our
present period is the characteristic expression of our nation's
being. What we are compelled to experience around us and
in us today is only the horrible, maddening, and infuriating
influence of the perjuring deed of November 9, 1918. Here
more than ever the poet's saying applies that evil begets
evil. But even at the present time, our people has not entirely
lost its good basic elements; they only are slumbering unawakened
in the depths; and from time to time it has been possible
to see, gleaming like summer lightning in an overcast firmament,
virtues which the future Germany will some day remember
as the first signs of an incipient recovery. More than once,
thousands and thousands of young Germans have stepped forward
with the self-sacrificing resolve to sacrifice their young
lives freely and joyfully on the altar of the beloved fatherland,
just as in 1914. Again, millions of men are diligently and
industriously at work, as though the ravages of the revolution
had never been. The blacksmith stands again at his anvil,
the peasant guides his plow, and the scholar sits in his
study, all with the same painstaking devotion to duty.
repressions on the part of our enemies no longer meet the
same condoning laughter as formerly, but grieved, embittered
faces. Undoubtedly a great change in sentiment has taken
today all this is not yet expressed in a rebirth of our
people's concept of political power and instinct of self-preservation,
it is the fault of those who, less by the grace of Heaven
than by self appointment, have governed our people to death
if we bemoan the state of the nation today, we may ask:
What has been done to improve it? Is the feeble support
given by the people to the decisions of our governments
- decisions which scarcely existed - only a sign of our
nation's small vitality or is it not even more a sign of
total failure in the handling of this precious treasure?
What have our governments done to reimplant the spirit
of proud self-reliance, manly defiance and wrathful hatred
in this people?
in the year 1919 the German people was burdened with the
peace treaty, we should have been justified in hoping that
precisely through this instrument of boundless repression
the cry for German freedom would have been immensely promoted.
Peace treaties whose demands are a scourge to nations
not seldom strike the first roll of drums for the uprising
could have been done with this peace treaty of Versailles?!
instrument of boundless extortion and abject humiliation
might, in the hands of a willing government, have become
an instrument for whipping up the national passions to fever
heat. With a brilliant propagandist exploitation of these
sadistic cruelties, the indifference of a people might have
been raised to indignation, and indignation to blazing fury!
could every single one of these points have been burned
into the brain and emotion of this people, until finally
in sixty million heads, in men and women, a common sense
of shame and a common hatred would have become a single
fiery sea of flame, from whose heat a will as hard as steel
would have risen and a cry burst forth:
us arms again!
my friends, that is what such a peace treaty would do. In
the boundlessness of its oppression, the shamelessness of
its demands, lies the greatest propaganda weapon for the
reawakening of a nation's dormant spirits of life.
this, to be sure, from the child's primer down to the last
newspaper, every theater and every movie house, every advertising
pillar and every billboard, must be pressed into the service
of this one great mission, until the timorous prayer of
our present parlor patriots: 'Lord, make us free!' is transformed
in the brain of the smallest boy into the burning plea:
'Almighty God, bless our arms when the time comes; be
just as thou hast always been; judge now whether we be deserving
of freedom; Lord, bless our battle!'
this was neglected and nothing was done.
then, will be surprised that our people is not as it should
be and could be? If the rest of the world sees in us only
a stooge, an obsequious dog, who gratefully licks the hands
that have just beaten him?
our capacity for alliances today is injured by our people,
but most of all by its governments. They in their corruption
are to blame if after eight years of the most unlimited
oppression so little will for freedom is present.
therefore, as an active alliance policy is linked with the
necessary evaluation of our people, the latter is equally
dependent on the existence of a governmental power which
does not want to be a handyman for foreign countries, not
a taskmaster over its own strength, but a herald of the
our people has a state leadership which sees its mission
in this light, six years will not pass before a bold Reich
leadership in the field of foreign affairs will dispose
of an equally bold will on the part of a people thirsting
second objection, the great difficulty of transforming hostile
peoples into friendly allies, can be answered as follows:
general anti-German psychosis cultivated in other countries
by war propaganda will inevitably continue to exist until
the German Reich, through the resurrection visible to all
of a German will for self-preservation, achieves the character
of a state which plays on the general European chessboard
and with which it is possible to play. Only when government
and people seem to provide absolute guaranty of a possible
fitness for alliance can one or another power, out of parallel
interest, think of reshaping public opinion by the effects
of propaganda. This, too, naturally requires years of shrewd
continuous work. The very need of this long period for altering
the sentiments of a people necessitates caution in undertaking
it; that is, no one will enter upon such an activity unless
he is absolutely convinced of the value of such a labor
and its fruits for the future. No one will want to change
the spiritual orientation of a nation on the strength of
the empty bragging of some more or less witty foreign minister,
without possessing a tangible guaranty of the value of a
new orientation. Otherwise this would lead to a complete
shattering of public opinion. The most reliable certainty
for the possibility of a future alliance with a state does
not lie in the bombastic phrases of individual members of
the government, but in the visible stability of a definite
and seemingly expedient governmental tendency, and in a
public opinion with an analogous orientation. The faith
in this will be the firmer, the greater the visible activity
of a governing power in the field of propagandist preparation
and foundation of its work, and, conversely, the more unmistakably
the will of public opinion is reflected in the governmental
nation, then, will - in our situation - be regarded as fit
for alliance, if government and public opinion with equal
fanaticism proclaim and uphold the will to fight for freedom.
This is the premise for beginning a reorientation in
the public opinion of other nations, which on the basis
of their knowledge are willing, in defense of their very
own interests, to go a stretch of the way by the side of
a partner who seems suitable to them - in other words, to
conclude an alliance.
there is one thing more to be said in this connection: Since
the transformation of a certain spiritual attitude in a
people requires hard work in itself, and at first will not
be understood by many, it is a crime and a stupidity at
once, to furnish these opposing elements with: weapons for
their counter-efforts by mistakes of one's own.
must be realized that it will necessarily take a certain
time before a people has completely comprehended the inner
purposes of a government, since explanations cannot be given
regarding the final ultimate aims of certain preliminary
political work, and one can only reckon either with the
blind faith of the masses or the intuitive insight of the
intellectually superior leader strata. But since in many
people this clairvoyant political sixth sense is not present,
and for political reasons explanations cannot be given,
a part of the intellectual leader class will always turn
against new tendencies which due to their incomprehensibility
can easily be interpreted as mere experiments. Thus, the
resistance of the anxious conservative elements is aroused.
this reason more than any other, it becomes our highest
duty to make sure that all serviceable weapons are wrested
from the hands of such disturbers of mutual understanding,
especially when, as in our case, we are dealing with nothing
but the totally impracticable, purely fantastic babble of
inflated parlor patriots and petit bourgeois café
politicians. For on calm reflection no one will seriously
deny that screaming for a new battle feet, for recovery
of our colonies, etc., is in reality nothing but silly gossip'
without so much as a thought of practical application. The
way in which the senseless outpourings of these knights
of the protest meeting, some of them innocent, some of them
insane, but all of them in the silent service of our mortal
enemies, are exploited in England, cannot be characterized
as favorable to Germany. And so we wear ourselves out in
harmful little demonstrations against God and the whole
world and forget the first principle which is the premise
for every success, to wit: Whatever you do, do it completely.
By beefing against five or ten states, we neglect the concentration
of all our will power and physical force for the thrust
to the heart of our infamous enemy, and sacrifice the possibility
of strengthening ourselves by an alliance for this conflict.
too, lies a mission for the National Socialist movement.
It must teach our people to look beyond trifles and see
the biggest things, not to split up over irrelevant things,
and never to forget that the aim for which we must fight
today is the bare existence of our people, and the sole
enemy which we must strike is and remains the power which
is robbing us of this existence.
things may be profoundly painful to us. But this is far
from being a ground for renouncing reason and bickering
loudly and senselessly with the whole world instead of attacking
the most mortal enemy in concentrated force.
the German people has no moral right to blame the rest of
the world for its conduct as long as it has not called to
account the criminals who sold and betrayed their whole
country. Really, it is not serious for us to curse and protest
against England, Italy, etc., from a distance, and leave
the scoundrels at large who, in the pay of enemy war propaganda,
took away our arms, broke our moral backbone, and auctioned
off the crippled Reich for thirty pieces of silver.
enemy does only what was to be predicted. We should learn
from his conduct and his acts.
who is really unwilling to rise to the heights of such a
conception should finally bear in mind that the only thing
remaining in that case is renunciation, because then any
alliance policy is impossible for the future. For if we
cannot ally ourselves with England because she stole our
colonies, or with Italy because she has the South Tyrol,
with Poland and Czechoslovakia on their merits, then, aside
from France - who incidentally did steal Alsace-Lorraine
from us - there would remain no one else in Europe.
this serves the German people is scarcely subject to doubt.
The only thing that can remain in doubt is whether such
an opinion is put forward by a simple dunce or by a shrewd
it comes to leaders, I always believe the latter.
so, in all human probability, a transformation of the psyche
of individual peoples, who have hitherto been hostile but
whose true future interests lie close to our own, may very
well be possible if the inner strength of our state as well
as our visible will for the preservation of our existence
again make us seem worthy as an ally, and, further, if awkward
movements of our own, or even criminal acts, do not furnish
grist for the mill of the enemies of such a future tie with
nations previously hostile to us.
hardest to answer is the third objection.
it conceivable that the representatives of the real interests
of the nations possible for alliance can put through their
views in opposition to the will of the Jewish mortal enemy
of free national states?
the forces of traditional British statesmanship, for example,
break the devastating Jewish influence or not?
question, as already stated, is very hard to answer. It
depends on too many factors to permit of a conclusive judgment.
One thing is certain in any case: In one country
the present state power can be regarded as so stabilized
and serves the interests of the country so absolutely that
we can no longer speak of a really effective obstruction
of political necessities by international Jewish forces.
struggle that Fascist Italy is waging, though perhaps
in the last analysis unconsciously (which I personally do
not believe), against the three main weapons of the Jews
is the best indication that, even though indirectly, the
poison fangs of this supra-state power are being torn out.
The prohibition of Masonic secret societies, the persecution
of the supra-national press, as well as the continuous demolition
of international Marxism, and, conversely, the steady reinforcement
of the Fascist state conception, will in the course of the
years cause the Italian government to serve the interests
of the Italian people more and more, without regard for
the hissing of the Jewish world hydra.
are more difficult in England. In this country of the 'freest
democracy,¦ the Jew exerts an almost unlimited dictatorship
indirectly through public opinion. And yet, even there an
incessant struggle is taking place between the advocates
of British state interests and the proponents of a Jewish
sharply these opposites often clash could be seen most clearly
for the first time after the War in the different attitude
toward the Japanese problem of the British government leaders
on the one hand and of the press on the other.
after the end of the War, the old strain in the relations
of America and Japan began to reappear. Of course, the great
European powers could not remain indifferent to this new
war danger. No ties of kinship can prevent a certain feeling
of envious concern in England toward the growth of the American
Union in all fields of international economic and power
politics. The former colonial country, child of the great
mother, seems to be growing into a new master of the world.
It is understandable that England today re-examines her
old alliances with anxious concern and British statesmen
gaze with trepidation toward a period in which it will no
longer be said:
rules the waves!' But instead: 'The seas for the
is harder to attack the gigantic American colossus of states
with the enormous wealth of its virgin soil than the wedged-in
German Reich. If the dice and the ultimate decision should
ever roll, England, if left to her own resources would be
doomed. And so they snatch eagerly at the yellow fist and
cling to an alliance which, from the racial viewpoint, is
perhaps unjustifiable, but from the viewpoint of state politics
nevertheless represents the sole possibility of strengthening
the British world position in the face of the upsurging
the English state leadership, despite the common struggle
on the European battlefields, could not resolve to relax
its alliance with the Asiatic partner, the whole Jewish
press fell on this alliance from behind.
is it possible that the organs of a Northcliffe, until 1918
the faithful armor-bearer of the British struggle against
the German Reich, should now break their loyalty and go
their own ways?
annihilation of Germany was not an English interest, but
primarily a Jewish one, just as today a destruction of Japan
serves British state interests less than it does the widespread
desires of the leaders of the projected Jewish world empire.
While England sweats to maintain her position in this world,
the Jew organizes his attack for its conquest.
already sees the present-day European states as will-less
tools in his fist, whether indirectly through a so-called
Western democracy, or in the form of direct domination by
Jewish Bolshevism. But it is not only the Old World that
he holds thus enmeshed, the same fate menaces the New. It
is Jews who govern the stock exchange forces of the American
Union. Every year makes them more and more the controlling
masters of the producers in a nation of one hundred and
twenty millions; only a single great man, Ford, to their
fury, still maintains full independence.
astute shrewdness they knead public opinion and make it
into an instrument for their own future.
the greatest heads of Jewry see the approaching fulfillment
of their testamentary prophecy about the great devouring
this great herd of denationalized colonial territories,
a single independent state might still wreck the whole work
at the eleventh hour. For a Bolshevistic world can exist
only if it embraces everything.
only a single state is preserved in its national strength
and greatness, the world empire of Jewish satrapies, like
every tyranny in this world, must succumb to the force of
the national idea.
the Jew knows only too well that in his thousand years of
adaptation he may have been able to undermine European peoples
and train them to be raceless bastards, but that he would
scarcely be in a position to subject an Asiatic national
state like Japan to this fate. Today he may mimic the German
and the Englishman, the American and Frenchman, but he lacks
the bridges to the yellow Asiatic. And so he strives to
break the Japanese national state with the strength of similar
existing formations in order to rid himself of the dangerous
adversary before the last state power is transformed in
his hand into a despotism over defenseless beings.
his millennial Jewish empire he dreads a Japanese national
state, and, therefore, desires its annihilation even before
establishing his own dictatorship.
so he incites the nations against Japan as he once did against
Germany, and this is what brings it about that, while British
statesmen are still striving to build on the alliance with
Japan, the British-Jewish press already demands struggle
against the ally, and prepares the war of annihilation under
the proclamation of democracy and under the battle-cry:
Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!
is how insubordinate the Jew has become in England today.
for this reason it is there that the struggle against the
Jewish world menace will begin.
again the National Socialist movement has the mightiest
task to fulfill.
must open the eyes of the people on the subject of foreign
nations and must remind them again and again of the true
enemy of our present-day world. In place of hatred against
Aryans, from whom almost everything may separate us, but
with whom we are bound by common blood or the great line
of a kindred culture, it must call eternal wrath upon the
head of the foul enemy of mankind as the real originator
of our sufferings.
must make certain that in our country, at least, the mortal
enemy is recognized and that the fight against him becomes
a gleaming symbol of brighter days, to show other nations
the way to the salvation of an embattled Aryan humanity.
the rest, may reason be our guide, may our will be our strength.
May the sacred duty to act in this way give us determinations
and above all may our faith protect us.