Part
I: Philosophy
CHAPTER I
STATIC
AND DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY
WE
have in England, probably to a greater extent than elsewhere,
two distinct systems of education flourishing side by side.
The distinction is clearly marked in the public schools and
universities; but it is traceable through every grade of educational
institution by the arrangements which are made to prepare candidates
for public and other examinations. These two systems in the
Public Schools are the Classical and the Modem sides, and have
their equivalent Triposes and Honours Schools in the universities.
One of these systems is Aristotelean, the second is Baconian.
Now,
it does not seem to be so clearly realised as it should be,
that these two systems of education are, considered separately,
incompatible. The classical system is the embodiment of an attractive
and artistic ideal or conception of the nature of society, and
the conditions under which society lives, moves, and has its
being. It is above, outside, possibly in advance of, facts.
The modern school, of which inductive natural science, based
upon the experimental ascertainment of fact, is the backbone,
has not essentially to do with ideals at all. It is realistic;
its first postulate is that forces act in a similar manner when
placed in a similar relation to each other. It refuses to admit,
as a fact, anything which cannot be demonstrated, and as a theory,
anything which does not fit the facts. For example, the classical
ideal contends that men "ought" to be good, brave and virtuous.
The modern, that it does not understand the meaning of goodness,
that bravery and virtue are not capable of exact definition,
and, that so far as the word "ought" has any meaning, it postulates
the existence of a force so far undemonstrated.
It
will be recognised on a moderate consideration, that the effect
on the everyday world of these two philosophies cannot fail
to be disruptive. The logical outcome of the classical ideal
is to lay the emphasis of any observed defects in the social
organisation on defects in the characters of the persons composing
the society. Wars occur because people are wicked, poverty,
because people are idle, crime, because they are immoral. Material
progress, which in its essence is applied Science, is repulsive
to the Classical mind, because it does, in fact, stultify the
rigid Classical ideal. Conversely, the scientific attitude tends
to the opposite extreme, towards what is called Determinism;
that people's actions, thoughts, and morals, are the outcome
of more or less blind forces to which they are subjected, and
in regard to which, both censure and praise are equally out
of place.
It
is probable that, as in many controversies, there is a good
deal to be said for both points of view, but it is even more
probable that approximate truth lies in appreciation of the
fact that neither conception is useful without the other. It
is probable that in the less fortunately situated strata of
society, a theory of economic Determinism would be a sound and
accurate explanation for the actions of 98 per cent of the persons
to whom it might be applied; that those persons are, in fact,
obliged to act and think in accordance with limitations which
are imposed upon them by their environment. In short, that their
environment is more powerful in shaping them, than they are
in shaping their environment. But this is not true of their
more fortunate contemporaries. There are, without a doubt, circumstances
in the world, in which the personal conceptions of individuals
can have powerful and far-reaching consequences on their immediate
and even national or continental environment. It seems reasonable
to believe that a Napoleon, a Washington, or a Bismarck have,
in effect, changed the course of history, just as it is certain
that a James Watt, a George Stephenson, or a Faraday, have altered
the centre of gravity of industrial and economic society.
All
this is sufficiently obvious, but the important idea to be drawn
from it, is that before human ideals (including the Classical
and religious ideals) can be brought into any effective relationship
with and control by the great mass of the population, that population
must be released from the undue pressure of economic forces.
It is quite arguable that Napoleon was a curse to Europe, but
it is not reasonably arguable that a Napoleon, if living at
this time, would be sure to repeat the history of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. It is reasonably arguable also,
that no man could reproduce the career of Napoleon or Bismarck
in a country in which the majority of the inhabitants were both
economically independent, and politically contented.
A
clear understanding of the circumstances in which personality
is of importance in effecting environment, and, on the other
hand, the circumstances in which it is unreasonable to expect
the development of personality which may be considered satisfactory
in a pragmatic sense is of the first importance to a balanced
consideration of the difficulties and dangers which beset the
civilised world at the present time, as well as to the framing
of proposals to meet the situation. No one, having devoted any
consideration to the subject, can fail to feel exasperation
at the exhortations of the sentimentalist forever clamouring
after a "change of heart." What effect on his particular difficulties
is it going to have, if the miner, abandoning self-interest,
goes to his employer and offers to accept half his present wages?
Or the mine-owner, faced with a loss, who raises his men's wages?
What effect on the dividends of the shopkeeper already in debt
to his bank, and in doubt as to the source from which he shall
pay his next week's rent, and meet the difference on his overdraft,
does it have, if smitten with the sudden desire to apply the
golden rule to business, he sells his goods at half their cost
to him, because he knows his clientele, who are coalminers,
cannot afford more; thus accelerating his progress to the bankruptcy
court and the cessation of his activities as a distributor?
What is the use of epileptic addresses on the criminality of
war, when the enemies' aeroplanes, if not stopped, propose dropping
poison gas-bombs on a population which has, probably, not the
faintest understanding of the casus belli.
On
the other hand, no one who has attempted to obtain a hearing
for concrete proposals of a social nature from persons who seemed
from their position in the world to be favourably situated in
respect of their furtherance, can fail to have realised that
a difficulty is always met with, in establishing a common point
of view; that in fact, it is a condition of executive position-holding,
that the point of view shall be in the highest degree, and in
the narrowest sense, conservative. It is not an unfair description
of the situation to say that those persons who in the main are
anxious for changes in the social structure are powerless to
effect them, while persons more favourably situated to bring
them about, are rarely anxious to do so. There is not much difference
in the "heart" of the two descriptions of person; the difference
in behaviour arises from the fact that one is reasonably satisfied
with his lot, the other is not.
This
is not an abstract problem, it is a practical problem of the
first importance. It can be stated in general terms as the problem
of bringing together of desire and the means of fulfilment,
in relation to the largest possible number of individuals. At
every step it is complicated in the practical world by the interjection
of so-called moral issues. The courageous bishop who stated
that he would rather see England free than sober, may, or may
not, have realised that he was postulating in an attractive
form, an issue which challenges the idea that a good end can
excuse a bad means. The same issue is raised by the endeavour
(a successful endeavour), to exhibit "unemployment" as a symptom
of industrial breakdown, rather than, as it should be, a sign
of economic progress.
Closely
interwoven with the classical and moral theory of society, is
the theory of rewards and punishments. So familiar is this idea,
through education and experience, to most people, that it is
only with some difficulty that they are brought to realise that
it is an artificial theory and not inherent in the nature of
things; that the statement "be good and you will be happy" does
not rely for any truth it may possess on any fixed relation
between the abstract qualities of goodness and happiness, but
upon the fixed relation of cause and effect between certain
actions to which the title "goodness" may arbitrarily be applied,
and their reactions which we term "happiness." This may appear
to be word splitting, but when we realise that the whole of
the industrial, legal, and social system of the world rests
for its sanctions on this theory of rewards and punishments,
it is difficult to deny the importance of an exact comprehension
of it.
For
instance, the industrial unrest which is disrupting the world
at the present time, can be traced without difficulty to an
increasing dissatisfaction with the results of the productive
and distributing systems. Not only do people want more goods
and more leisure, and less regimentation, but they are increasingly
convinced that it is not anything inherent in the physical world
which prevents them from attaining their desires; yet captains
of industry favourably situated for the purpose of estimating
the facts, are almost unanimous in demanding a moral basis for
the claim put forward. That is to say, those persons whose activities
at the present time are chiefly concerned with restricting the
output of the economic machine to its lowest limit, while yet
asking each individual to produce more, are determined that
not even the over-spill of production shall get into the hands
of a semi-indigent population, without some equivalent of what
is called work, even though the work may still further complicate
the problem with which these industrial leaders are concerned.
Nor is it fair to say that this attitude is confined to the
employing classes. Labour leaders are eloquent on the subject,
and with reason. The theory of rewards and punishments is the
foundation stone of the Labour leaders' platform, just as it
is of the employer whom he claims to oppose. The only difference
is in respect of the magnitude and award of the prizes and as
to the rules of the competition for them. To any one who will
examine the subject carefully and dispassionately it must be
evident that Marxian Socialism is an extension to its logical
conclusion, of the theory of modern business.
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